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(L. A. No. 24090. In Bank.

NOT. 5, 1957.J

ALICE F. ROZAN, Respondent, v. MAXWELL M. ROZAN,
Appellant.

)

[1] Con1liet of Laws-Personal Property.-Marital interests in
movables acquired during coverture are governed by the law
of the domicile at the time of their acquisition.
[2] IeL-Personal Property.-The interests of spouses in movables
do not change though the movables are taken into another
state or are used to purchase land in another state.
[3] Divorce-Evidence-Residence.-A finding in a divorce action
that the spouses established their residence in the state not
later than July of 1948 was sustained by evidence that they
resided in another state until May of that year; by the wife's
testimony that, after learning she was pregnant, they decided

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 40 et seq.; Am.Jur.. Conflict of Laws, § 65 et seq.
[3] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 66; Am.Jur.,
Divorce and Separation, § 248.
McB:. Dig. References: [1,2] Conflict of Laws, § 18; [3] Divorce,
§ 101; [4, 5, 9, 10] Husband and Wife, § 200 j [6] Husband and
Wife, § 48 j [7] Husband and Wife, § 69 j [8] Divorce, § 234(2) ;
[11] Courts, § 26; [12] Equity, § 7; [13] Judgments, § 474; [14,15]
Divorce, § 132.

)

Nov. 1957]

ROZAN

v.

ROZAN

323

£49 C.2d 322; 317 P.2d 11)

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

that she should go to the husband's sistcr-in-law's place in Los
Angeles, which she did, that later in July he came to Los
Angeles, and that they took up their residence in Canoga Park
where they lived from August until December of the following year, at which time they rented a furnished house at San
Gabriel, later bought the house and thereafter lived there;
and by the husband's testimony that he "moved out here
[California] when [the wife] came out here to give birth to
our son" and that he had voted in this state "By absentee
ballot at the last presidential election [1952]" and had considered this his residence since 1948.
Husband and Wife - Actions - Evidence.-A finding in a
divorce action that, after the spouses became domiciled in
this state and as a result of the husband's work and skills as
an oil broker and operator they acquired some money and
property, but that they thereafter lost everything so acquired
by them and he was obliged to apply to the Veterans' Administration for a pension in order to furnish them their necessary
living expenses and necessities of life, was substantiated by
the wife's testimony as well as that of the husband, who stated
"At that time I was hard pressed. I had properties but no
income."
Id.-Actions-Evidence.-A finding in a divorce action that
properties acquired out of the state were purchased with movables was sustained by the husband's testimony that he made
a lot of money on Canadian ventures as an oil operator and
that it was with this money that the properties were purchased.
Id.-Community or Separate Property - Property Acquired
Out of State.-Purchase money for properties acquired out of
the state by efforts and skill of a husband as an oil operator
subsequent to establishment of a California domicile is community property.
Id.-Determination of Character of Property.-In the absence
of evidence of gift, bequest, devise or descent, it is presumed
that all property acquired by a husband after marriage is
community property. (Civ. Code, §§ 163, 164.)
Divorce - Disposition of Community Property - Extreme
Cruelty.-Where a divorce is granted on the ground of extreme
cruelty, it is within the court's discretion to assign the community property to the respective parties in such proportions
as it deems just. (Civ. Code. § 146.)

[9] Husband and Wife-Actions-Evidence.-A finding in a wife's
divorce action that the hushand's purported transfers of COIllmunity realty to ~is nephew took place on or about the dates
of recordation, not on the dates in the deeds, was supported
by evidence that many of the dates on the notarized deeds
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were dates that other evidence showed could not possibly be
the dates on which the deeds were notarized.
[10] Id.-Actions-Evidence.~Findings in a divorce action that
purported transfers of community realty by the husband to
third persons were fraudulent as to the wife and were not
bona fide were sustained by evidence that one transferee did
not own the lease he was giving in trade for the realty, that
the same realty was later transferred to defendant's nephew
and the first transferee accepted as payment the nephew's un·
secured note for some $49,000, that much of the land was
transferred to the nephew as trostee of a purported trust for
which there was no consideration, and that the wife did not
consent to the transfers.
[11] Courts---Jurisdiction-Scope.-A court of one state cannot
directly affect or determine the title to land in another.
[12] Equity-Jurisdiction-Extra.territorial Action.-A court, with
the parties before it, can compel the execution of a conveyance
in the form required by the law of the situs, and such con·
veyance will be recognized there.
[13] Judgments-Foreign Judgments-Full Faith and Credit.-A
decree of a court of equity should be given the same full faith
and credit as is accorded any other kind of judgment.
[14] Divorce-J'udgment-.B.es Judicata.-A judgment in a divorce
action affecting a division of community realty in another
state is res judicata and entitled to full faith and credit in
the other state to the extent that it determines the rights and
equities of the parties with respect to such realty, but must
be modified to the extent it purports to affect the title to the
land.
[15] Id.-Judgment.-A divorce judgment was not binding on defendant's nephew, who held the record title to community
realty, nor on a minor child, who was the beneficiary of a purported trost, where they were not parties to the action.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of LoR
Angeles County. Harold C. Shepherd, Judge.- Modified and
affirmed.
Action for divorce.
affirmed.

Judgment for plaintiff modified and

Maxwell M. Rozan, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Gustave L. Goldstein for Respondent.
------------------~'.

-------------------------------

[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, §§ 78, 79; Am.Jur., Courts, § 240.

• A8signed by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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TRA YNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action against her
husband, Maxwell M. Rozan, for divorce, support, custody of
their minor child, and division of their community property.
Certain other persons involved in transactions with Rozan
were named defendants. Appearances were made on behalf
of defendants Rozan, Lee McCormick, and Bernard Siegel.
Edward Rosen and M. W. Truss appeared pro se.
The trial court granted plaintiff an interlocutory judgment
of divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, awarded her
the custody of the minor child, ordered defendant to pay $75
per month for child support, $250 per month for plaintiff's
support, and $12,500 for attorney's fees. The court adjudged
that the parties became domiciled in California in May 1948
and in any event not later than July 1948 and that the
property thereafter acquired was community property and
awarded plaintiff 65 per cent thereof. Defendant appeals.
Although defendant "does not challenge the lower Court
for granting the divorce" and "is content to have the divorce
granted to Respondent, so as to terminate the instant marriage" he contends that there was not sufficient evidence that
he was guilty of cruelty to justify awarding plaintiff more
than 50 per cent of the property, that certain oil properties
outside of California adjudged to be community property
were his separate property, and that the court erred in finding
that there was no consideration for defendant's transfer of
certain property, that certain transfers were made to defeat
plaintiff's interest therein, that the parties became domiciled
in California and in awarding plaintiff attorney's fees, alimony, and child support.
The reporter's transcript of 886 pages contains conflicting
evidence with respect to all matters questioned by defendant,
and it cannot reasonably be doubted that it contains substantial evidence in support of the findings and judgment.
No useful purpose would be served in recounting the many
incidents that support the court's finding of extreme cruelty.
The amounts awarded for attorney's fees, alimony, and child
support were not unreasonable under the facts as found by
the trial court. Since defendant is primarily concerned with
the division of property, we shall review briefly the evidence
that supports that division.
The first finding eSSential to the division of the property
is that plaintiff and defendant "established their residence
and domicile in California in May, 1948, and in any event
not later than July, 1948" and "that ever since they have
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been and still are residents of and domiciled in the State of
California." [1] A determination of the domicile is essential, for marital interests in movables acquired during coverture are governed by the law of the domicile at the time of
their acquisition. (Schecter v. Superior Court, ante, pp.
3, 10-11 [314 P.2d 10]; Estate of Bruggemeyer, 115 Cal.
App. 525, 538 [2 P.2d 534] ; Jl!stis v. Atchison, T. &: S. F. Ry.
Co., 12 Cal.App. 639, 644 [108 P. 328] ; Civ. Code, § 164; see
Rest., Conflict of Laws, § 290; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws
[2d ed.] p. 313; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3d ed.) p. 385.)
[2] Moreover, the interests of the spouses in movables do
not change even though the movables are taken into another
state or are used to purchase land in another state. (Tomaier
v. Tomaier, 23 Ca1.2d 754, 759 [146 P.2d 905] ; Depas v. Mayo,
11 Mo. 314, 319 [49 Am.Dec. 88] ; see also Beard's Ex'r v.
Basye, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 133, 146; Avery v. Avery, 12 Tex.
54 [62 Am.Dec. 513] ; Rest., Conflict of Laws, §§ 290, 291;
Stumberg, Conflict of Laws [2d ed.] p. 314; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws [3d ed.] p. 378.)
Defendant contends that there is no evidence that he was
ever in California before July of 1948 and that sending his
pregnant wife to California to make a home there in May of
1948 did not establish his domicile in California. (See Sheehan v. Scott, 145 Cal. 684, 690 (79 P. 350]; 17 Pitts.L.Rev.
97.) It is unnecessary to determine whether defendant was
domiciled in this state prior to July 1948, for all the property
involved was acquired subsequent to that date.
[3] The record shows that plaintiff and defendant resided
in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, until May 19, 1948. Plaintiff ,
testified that in January of that year they learned that plaintiff was pregnant. They had a letter from defendant '8 sisterin-law inviting plaintiff and defendant to live with h'er and
stating that she would take care of plaintiff and give her a i
good home until defendant made a fresh start in life. Plain- '
tiff and defendant agreed that they would make their home
wherever plaintiff wished and they decided that she should
go to defendant's sister-in-Iaw's place in Los Angeles. She
left for Los Angeles and that day or the next, defendant left
for Canada. In July 1948 defendant came to Los Angeles,
and he and plaintiff went house-hunting and took up their
residence in Canoga,Park, where they lived from August 1948
until December 1949. Defendant lived there when he was
in town until December 1949, when they rented a furnished
house at San Gabriel with an option to buy. They bought the
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house and thereafter lived there. Defendant was interested
in oil lands and traveled extensively. In a deposition hc
stated "I moved out here [California] when Mrs. Rozan came
out here to give birth to our son" ; that he had voted in California "By absentee ballot at the last presidential election
[1952]" and had considered this his residence since 1948.
The foregoing evidence amply supports the trial court's finding of domicile not later than July, 1948.
[4] The next essential finding on which the division of
property depends is "that after plaintiff and defendant be~
came domiciled in California, as a result of defendant's work,
efforts, ability, and skills as an oil broker and operator, they
acquired some money and property but that in the latter
part of 1948 and in any event before May 1949 they lost
everything so acquired by them from the latter part of 1948
until May 1949 and had none thereof and that sometime
between December 1948 and May 1949, Rozan was obliged to
apply to the Veterans' Administration for a pension in order
to furnish plaintiff and Rozan their necessary living expenses
and necessities of life." This finding is substantiated by the
testimony of plaintiff as well as that of defendant, who stated
"At that time I was hard pressed. I had properties but no
income."
[5] The last finding on which the division of property
depends is that the North Dakota properties "were acquired
with community property and community property money."
It is undisputed that these properties were acquired after
1949, at which time plaintiff and defendant had no funds.
Defendant's testimony supports the finding that these properties were purchased with movables, for he testified that he
made a lot of money on his Canadian ventures as an oil operator and that it was with this money that the North Dakota
properties were purchased. Both plaintiff's and defendant's
testimony supports the finding that at the time of trial they
still owned everything that they owned when they left Colorado in May of 1948, except two parcels that defendant transferred to a trust for his son and an interest that plaintiff
sold. Plaintiff accounted for the expenditure of the proceeds
received from the sale of that interest. [6] It thus appears
that the purchase :qloney for the North Dakota properties
was acquired by J;.be efforts and skill of defendant as an oil
operator subsequent to the establishment of the California
domicile and was therefore community property. (Schecter
T. Superior Oourt, supra, ante, pp. 3, 10-11.)
[7] More-
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over there is a presumption that in the absence of evidence of
gift, bequest, devise or descent, all property acquired by the
husband after marriage is community property. (Civ. Code,
§§ 163, 164; Estate of Duncan, 9 Cal.2d 207, 217 [70 P.2d
174] ; Estate of Jolly, 196 Cal. 547, 553 [238 P. 353] ; Nilson
v. Sarment,153 Cal. 524, 527 [96 P. 315, 126 Am.St.Rep. 911 ;
Wilson v. Wilson, 76 Cal.App.2d 119, 125-126 [172 P.2d
568}.) [8] There is no evidence that the purchase money
was acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. There is,
therefore, substantial evidence to sustain the trial court's
finding that the North Dakota properties were purchased with
community property funds. It follows that the trial court
could properly declare that the plaintiff was entitled to 65
per cent of such property as against the husband, for it is
within the sound discretion of the trial court to assign the
community property to the respective parties in such proportions as it deems just when a divorce is granted on the ground
of extreme cruelty (Civ. Code, § 146).
[9] After acquiring the real property in North Dakota,
defendant divested himself of title thereto by means of
various conveyances, and title was eventually put in the name
of Eugene Rosen, defendant's nephew, either individually or
as trustee of a purported trust for the minor child. The
defendant contends that the trial court erred in holding that
these were not actual transactions, but were without consideration and fraudulent as to the plaintiff. The trial court found
that the purported transfers took place on or about the dates
of recordation and not on the dates in the deeds. This finding
is supported by the evidence that many of the dates on the
notarized deeds were dates that other evidence showed could
not possibly be the dates on which the deeds were notarized.
Thus, there was evidence that defendant was not even in
North Dakota when some of the purported notarized dating
took place. Most of the notarizing was done by the same
notary, McCormick's secretary. McCormick was a party to
certain of the North Dakota transactions that the court declared were fraudulent. Although McCormick was a codefendant in this action, he did not appeal.
[10] Other evidence also indicates that these transactions
were not bona fide. In the Kvam transaction defendant purported to trade the Kvam property and the "five Wanberg
acres" to McCorlJ1ick in exchange for the Tripp County
lease. The deal was purportedly closed at a time when McCormick did not own the Tripp County lease that he was
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giving in trade. At the same time, or within a day or two,
the K vam property was transferred to Eugene Rosen, nephew
of the defendant, and McCormick accepted as payment
Rosen's unsecured note for some $49,000. He admitted that
he knew nothing about Rosen's financial status and stated
that Rosen had as much as told him that •• he didn't have any
money. " McCormick had never made a title search on the
Kvam property, and defendant had never made a title search
on the Tripp County land, which was claimed to be worth
$53,500. The testimony of defendant and McCormick with
respect to these transactions was vague and evasive and dif·
fered as to how and where the transactions were carried out.
It further appears that McCormick accepted the Rud lease,
owned by defendant, in payment for Rosen's $49,000 note,
although the value of the Rud lease did not exceed $880.
Much of the land was transferred to Eugene Rosen as trustee
of a purported trust for the minor child, and admittedly there
was no consideration therefor. All of these transff:!rs were
without the consent of the plaintiff.
It is significant that since plaintiff began this action, defendant divested himself of title to all but one parcel of his
land in North Dakota, some 18 parcels, and that each parcel
was placed in the name of his nephew, Eugene Rosen, either
individually or as a purported trustee. In his deposition taken
at Silver Springs, Maryland, except for giving his name and
address and identifying certain documents, Eugene Rosen
refused to answer all questions on the ground that his answers
might tend to incriminate him. The only property that defendant purportedly owns is the Tripp County lease, which
the court found was transferred from McCormick to defendant
to simulate consideration for the apparently valuable Kvam
property and the five Wanberg acres. Both of these latter
parcels were transferred the same day or within a day or
two to Eugene Rosen. It is also significant that although defendant claims that some of the property transferred to his
nephew individually was for a consideration, he cannot ac·
count for the consideration. Thus, there is abundant evidence to support the trial court's finding that these transactions were fraudulent as to plaintiff.
As to the $2,500 note of M. W. Truss that defendant pur·
portedly sold to MC,Cormick, substantial evidence supports
the trial court's finding that it was only a "wash" trans·
action for the purpose of depriving plaintiff of her interest
in the note and the proceeds thereof and that the proceeds
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collected by the receiver in this suit are community property.
Furthermore, such a finding, even if erroneous, was detrimental to McCormick and not to defendant, and McCormick
has not appealed.
Defendant contends finally that the judgment directly af·
fects the title to land in another state and therefore exceeded
the court's jurisdiction. [11] A court of one state cannot
directly affect or determine the title to land in another. (Fall
v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11 [30 s.Ot. 3, 54 L.Ed. 65, 23 L.R.A.
N.S. 924] ; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87, lQ6 [11 S.Ct.
960,35 L.Ed. 640] ; Taylor v. Taylor, 192 Cal.7i, 76 [218 P.
756, 51 A.L.R. 1074J j Melvin v. Oarl, 118 Cal.App. 249, 251
[4 P.2d 954] ; Redwood lnv. Co. v. Ezley, 64 Cal.App. 455, 458
[221 P. 973] j Launer v. Griffen, 60 Cal.App.2d 659, 662
[141 P.2d 236].) [12] It is well settled, however, that a
court, with the parties before it, can compel the execution
of a conveyance in the form required by the law of the situs
and that such a conveyance will be recognized there. (Muller
v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444, 449-450 [24 L.Ed. 207]; Watkins v.
Holman, 16 Pet. (U.S.) 25,57 [10 L.Ed. 873] ; Oorbett v. Nutt,
10 Wall (U.S.) 464, 475 [19 L.Ed. 976]; Massie v. Watts,
6 Cranch. (U.S.) 148, 160- [3 L.Ed. 181] j Oole v. Manning,
79 Cal.App. 55, 63 [248 P. 1065] j Tully v. Bailey, 46 Cal.App.
2d 195, 200 [115 P.2d 542) j Deschenes v. Tallman,248 N.Y. 33
[161 N.E. 321, 322]; see Rest., Conflict of Laws, § 97, comment aj Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land
Decrees, 21 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 620, 628-629.) If the court
has entered a decree of specific performance, but the conveyance has not been executed, the majority of states, blcluding California, will give effect to the decree. (Spalding
v. Spalding, 75 Cal.App. 569, 580 [243 P. 445] j Redwood Inv.
Co. v. EzZey, 64 Cal.App. 455, 458 [221 P. 973] j Idaho Gold
Min. Co. v. Winchell, (Idaho) 59 P. 533, 535 [96 Am.St.Rep.
290] ; Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 607, 622 [173 N.W. 127] ;
Meents v. Oomstock, 230 Iowa 63, 69 [296 N.W. 721] ; Dunlap
v. Byers, 110 Mich. 109, 117 [67 N.W. 1067]; Deschenes v.
Tallman, 248 N.Y. 33 [161 M.E. 321, 322] ; RobUn v. Long,
60 How.Pr. (N.Y.) 200, 205; Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio
St. 474, 479-480 [15 Am.Rep. 621] j Mallette v. Scheerer, 164
Wis. 415, 419 [160 N.W. 182]; see Stumberg, Conflict of
Laws [2d ed.] p. 125.) Thus in Redwood Inv. 00. v. E:z;ley,
64 Cal.App. 455, 499 [221 P. 973], the court stated with reference to a Kentuc'ky decree of specific performance to land in
California: 'c It may be pleaded as a basis or cause of action
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or defense in the courts of the state where the land is situated.
and is entitled in such a court to the force and effect of record
evidence of the equities therein determined unless it be im.
peached for fraud. " [13] There is no sound reason for deny·
ing a decree of a court of equity the same full faith and credit
accorded any other kind of judgment. .. Without exception.
the courts recognize the validity of a deed executed under
the compulsion of a foreign decree. But if the decree did
not deal rightfully and constitutionally with the title to the
land it would be voidable" for duress. Recognition of the deed
necessarily involves acceptance of the decree. Whatever in·
trusion on the state's exclusive control is implied in the recog·
nition of the decree is accomplished through the recognition
of the deed. A policy so easily evaded, so dependent on the
success of the defendant in eluding the enforcement process
of the foreign court, is a formal, lifeless thing, and the truth
must be that foreign judicial proceedings of this type pose no
real threat to the legitimate interest of the situs state."
(Currie, supra, 21 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 620, 628.629.) Thus in
the majority of states, such decrees are given dect as a res
judicata declaration of the rights and equities of the parties.
(Cases supra; Mills v. Mills, 147 Cal.App.2d· 107, 116-119
[305 P.2d 61] ; Hicks v. Corbett, 130 Cal.App.2d 87, 90 [278
P.2d 77] ; Dodd v. Bell, 180 Ga. 313 [178 S.E. 663, 664] ; Dob·
son v. P6OII'ce, 12 N.Y. 156, 166 [62 Am.Dec. 152] ; Baughan
v. Goodwin, (Tex.Civ.App.) 162 S.W.2d 732, 736; Hall v.
Jones, (Tex.Civ.App.) 54 S.W.2d 835, 836; see Barbour, The
Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree, 17 Mich.L.
Rev. 527, 532; Currie, supra, 21 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 620, 629, 678679; Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to
Equitable Decrees for the Conveyance of Foreign Land, 34
Yale L.J. 591, 612.) Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 [30 S.Ct. 3, 54
L.Ed. 65, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 924], on which defendant relies did
not hold otherwise. "In that case the Washington decree
directly affected title to land in Nebraska. A commissioner of
the Washington court had executed a deed to that land and
Mrs. Fall attempted to use this deed as a muniment of title
in her action to quiet title against a grantee of the husband.
[14] In the light of the foregoing principles the judgment
in the present case is res judicata and entitled to full faith
and credit in North,"Dakota to the extent that it determines
the rights and equtties of the parties with respect to the land
in question. An action on that judgment in North Dakota.
however, is necessary to effect any change in the title to the
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land there. Thus, the judgment must be affirmed to the extent that it declares the rights of the parties before the court
and modified to the extent that it purports to afl'ect the title
to the land.
[15] Neither Eugene Rosen, who holds record title, nor
the minor child, who is the beneficiary of the purported trust,
were parties to this action and the judgment is therefore not
binding on them. Defendant and McCormick are bound,
however, for they were parties to the action and appeared
therein.
.
In several respects the judgment purportS to afl'ect title to
the land and must therefore be modified. Thus, paragraph 11
declares that the Rollins' deed purporting to convey the K vam
property to McCormick is a nullity, that McCormick never
acquired title, and that therefore Rosen never acquired title.
Accordingly, the judgment is modified by striking paragraph
11 therefrom.
Paragraph 21 of the judgment awards 65 per cent of the
North Dakota properties and the past, present, and future
rents, issues and profits therefrom to plaintiff as her sole and
separate property and awards 35 per cent thereof to Rozan
subject to a lien for alimony, child support, and attorney'.
fees. This paragraph purports to act directly on the property,
and is therefore modified to read as follows: "21. IT Is
FURTHER ORDERED A.ND ADJUDGED, that each and everyone
of the aforementioned North Dakota properties mentioned and
more specifically described in finding of fact No. 18 and each
of the subparagraphs thereof, and the Kvam property, were
acquired with community property funds of plaintUI and
Rozan j that said properties were transferred to defeat plaintiff's rights as described in paragraph 18; that plaintUf is
entitled to 65% of the aforementioned properties and of the
rents, issues and profits thereof as against Rozan j that Rozan
is entitled to 35% of the aforementioned properties and of i.
the rents, issues and profits thereof as againsfplaintitf j and,"
Paragraph 31 (C1. Tr. p. 92, lines 22-29) purports to declare
a lien on Rozan's interest in the North Dakota land and is
therefore modified to read as follows: "31. IT Is FURTHER
ORDERED A.ND ADJUDGED, that plaintitf have, and is hereby
given a lien for aforementioned alimony, child support and
attorney's fees upon any and all separate property that Rozan
now has in the Sta~· of California."
Paragraphs 7 ana 18 of the judgment purport to act directly
on the property bY' declaring that certain properties "were
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and still are the community property of plaintiff and Rozan;".
The judgment is therefore modified by striking in paragraph
7 the words "became, were and still are the community property of plaintiff and Rozan" (01. Tr. p. 84, lines 27-28) and
by striking in paragraph 18 the words "at all times herein
mentioned were and still are the community property of
plaintiff and Rozan" (01. Tr. p: 89, lines 6-7) and inserting
in lieu thereof in each instance the words "were acquired
with community property funds of plaintiff and ·Rozan."
'l'he judgment is affirmed as modified. Defendant shall
bear the costs on appeal.
Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., Oarter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and McOomb, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
4, 1957.
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